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# Fichte 1AC New

I value **morality**. Agency is intersubjective in that we can only become agents by the recognition of others. Grounding your identity self-referentially on the Cartesian formulation “I think therefore I am” fails –

**A.** **Circularity**: you’re can only become aware of yourself by self-reflection if you already understand of who “you” are. It presupposes what you seek to prove. Relational grounding avoids that dilemma since it allows you to locate yourself by reference to what you *are not* instead.

**B. Phenomenology**: the perspective of your consciousness means directly “seeing” yourself is impossible and begs the question: if you could do that, it wouldn’t be you perceiving anymore – it would be some external perspective instead. Only your relations with others are apparent to you, so they’re the only basis for deduction.

For an agent to act freely it must first understand the concept of free action, that it can act in response to reasons, which explain a course of action without causally necessitating it That cannot be internal without begging the question, so it must be in response to a summons. This culminates in reciprocal limitations on freedom. **Neuhouser[[1]](#footnote-1)**

The deduction's second theorem (§3) makes one of the Foundations's most original and exciting claims, and it is essential to Fichte's project of showing that rights are necessary conditions of self-consciousness. Its claim is that ascribing to oneself free efficacy (or agency) in the sensible world requires ascribing the same capacity to other rational beings. Fichte argues here that in order for a subject to be conscious of its own agency, it must first find that agency, as an object for its consciousness, in the external world. The thought here appears to be that the subject cannot come to an awareness of itself as practically free simply by seeing the results of its agency in the world, for in order to act freely, it would first have to know itself as free. The subject, then, must learn about its freedom in some other manner; it must somehow experience itself as free prior to any actual instances of its agency. Fichte's claim in §3 is that the only possible solution to this problem is to suppose that external evidence of one subject's agency is provided by another free subject. This occurs through a “summons” that one already formed subject makes to another. The summons is a call to act, a call to realize one's free efficacy, which takes the form of an imperative: You ought to "resolve to exercise your agency" (§3, III). Fichte concludes from this that the freedom of one subject (which includes consciousness of its freedom) requires the existence of others; free individuality is possible only in relation to other subjects, and so intersubjectivity is a necessary condition of self-consciousness. As Fichte sums up his result in the first Corollary to §3: "The human being . . . becomes a human being only among human beings;... it follows that if there are to be human beings, at all, there must be more than one. From here Fichte moves to the final step of the deduction of the concept of right (§4). Its claim is that positing the existence of other rational beings requires thinking of oneself as standing in a particular relation to them, a relation that turns out to be the "relation of right." The argument behind this claim is that in order to be conscious of myself as a free individual, I must be able to distinguish my own free agency from that of the other subjects whose existence I necessarily posit (as established in §3). According to Fichte, this requires "ascribing exclusively to myself a sphere for my free choice" (§4, II), a sphere to which other free beings have no access. But, given that I share the external world with other free beings, this is possible only if my individuality is recognized by those beings as setting limits to their own free agency. (And the same, of course, is required of me in relation to them if they are to attain consciousness of themselves as free individuals.) This recognition is more than just a theoretical acknowledgment of my status as a free being; it also requires that I be treated as such by other subjects or, in other words, that my free agency acquire a real and protected existence in the external world. But this is nothing more than the requirement that I possess a set of rights that are respected by others, which is what Fichte means by "standing in a relation of right" to other rational beings.

Your recognition of the Other constrains its existence and proves to you that it has a certain set of features, so their structure and reasons aren’t beyond your comprehension. I hijack the internal link to Levinasian NCs and disprove their critical premise.

The **standard** is respecting reciprocal claims to an external sphere of freedom. Prefer it:

1. Neuhouser is a prior question to other framework warrants: a moral theory can only judge free actions – that’s why neither a tree falling and killing someone nor an involuntary muscle spasm are things that ethics says deserve moral condemnation. There is only an ethical question after the summons.

2. **Culpability**: Holding someone else morally responsible is possible only for agents who can hold themselves responsible by the same standard, which means the authority to do so must come from a shared perspective, the perspectives of free and rational agents. **Darwall[[2]](#footnote-2)**

In supposing, moreover, that an addressee is responsible for complying with a demand, an addresser is committed to a number of other assumptions that imply a second-personal authority issuing from second- personal competence. First, the addresser can intelligibly hold an addressee responsible for compliance only if she assumes that he can hold himself responsible. But the addressee can do this only if he can blame himself for not complying, that is, only if he can make the demand of himself from the same perspective from which he accepts the addresser’s authority, that is, the standpoint of a free and rational agent. Likewise, second, to hold the addressee responsible, an addresser must assume that the addressee would be blameworthy for failing to comply with the demand. So the addresser must also assume that her own authority to blame the addressee for noncompliance comes ultimately from the very same point of view. She must think that were the addressee not to comply without excuse, he would be to blame period, that is, from a perspective that the addresser and addressee can share as free and rational. Third, in assuming that an addressee is responsible for complying with a demand, the addresser must presuppose that she has an authority to relate to the addressee in “demanding” ways that would be illegitimate were she to lack the authority.

Precludes the derivation of an alternative set of duties since it’s the only way to make normative claims binding: without conceding the to this premise, no theory can be motivational. My standard trivially follows from this requirement. **Darwall 2 explains Fichte**

For Fichte, it is second-personal engagement that makes us aware of a kind of freedom we have that is fundamentally unlike any that is involved in theoretical reasoning or in practical reasoning from a naîve first-person standpoint. Fichte believes that second-personal engagement commits addresser and addressee alike to limiting their “external freedom” through the “principle of right.”20 In so doing, each “lets his own external freedom be limited through inner freedom” (2000: 10). “Inner freedom” must thus include second-personal competence. Addresser and addressee freely restrict their external freedom when they accept one another’s authority and impose demands on themselves (the principle of right) that either person would make on both from a standpoint they can both share as rational and free (second-personally competent). As I interpret it, therefore, Fichtean “inner freedom” (second-personal competence) is the formal analogue of Kant’s autonomy of the will.

3. **Reflection**: Ethics only occurs to free beings, since it’s about the question of what to do. Freedom is the internal link since every desire is instantiated by a reason that acts through freedom. **Wood**[[3]](#footnote-3)

The next task is to explore this new kind of drive and to see its connection to our freedom. Crucial to Fichte’s argument at this point is the way in which freedom is seen to belong already to our most basic organic drives or desires, simply because they belong to a living thing that is articulated and apprehends them as determinate solely through reflection. In relation to contemporary views what Fichte is saying is that actions are never caused, or adequately explained, merely by desires, even when combined with beliefs about how the desires are to be satisfied. This is because every desire is essentially something reflected on, that acts on us only through our capacity to determine ourselves freely. Every desire presents itself to us as something that can be resisted and acted against.

**A.** Moving from a drive to a free action to secure a specific good requires the bridge principle, so I preempt all theories by controlling the link to their instantiation.

**B.** Answers skep or determinism - our first-person perspective inherently requires us to deliberate and find reasons so even if their arguments are true, they’re nonresponsive

**C.** Preempts constitutive links ­- we can give up any end but never rational action itself. Even if we care about something else, it’s an empirical rather than logical necessity so it’s less binding.

**Next**, a state is necessary to reconcile individual claims to freedom into a system that allows for everyone’s rights to be protected. Right can be realized in the world only through an institution that can protect against violations. **Neuhouser 2**

In the following chapter Fichte establishes a further right individuals have independently of the state, the right of coercion. He deduces this right by observing that outside a state there is no rational basis for believing that one's original rights will be respected by others and hence no guarantee that the conditions of one's free agency will be secured. Thus, if the free agency of individuals is to be realized - or, more precisely, if the right to its realization is to be enforceable - individuals must have the right (permission) to "violate . . . the freedom and personality" of any person who violates their original rights (§8, II). The right to coerce others to respect one's original rights, though "natural" in the sense indicated above, is not itself an original right, because it ceases to be a right of individuals once the state is formed. In fact, it is precisely because according this right to individuals is incompatible with the realization of original rights - it makes their enforcement highly irregular- that the state is necessary.

**Thus**, no framework can develop rights claims without the state as an enforcer – my offense turns NCs and outweighs since only I provide the structure to actualize claims. **Ripstein[[4]](#footnote-4)**

Kant’s point about disputes is not just a reiteration of Locke’s familiar claim that people often disagree about the application of principles to particular situations, especially when their interests are at stake. Unilateral judgment is a problem because of the two dimensions of the innate right of humanity. The innate right to freedom demands that people be able to acquire things as their means without the explicit leave of others. Rightful honor requires people to stand up for their rights, and so that no person defer to any other private person’s judgment in cases of dispute about what either is permitted to do. If you think that you have performed an act establishing a right, you are entitled to stand by your claim in the face of all who contest it, but those who contest it are no less entitled to stand by their claims. Rightful honor requires that each party accept no standard other than “what seems right and good” to him.”24 The only reason to defer is because you can’t win. Might makes right, regardless of how "good and law-abiding" you or the person who disputes your claim might be. The solution to disputes about rights is to make the omnilateral will institutional. Disputes can be resolved in a way that is consistent with rightful honor if the parties to it are subject to the authority of an impartial judge, and an enforcer who can carry out the decision. The state is a generalized version of this structure. It is a common authority, charged with making, applying, and enforcing law. It is legitimate because it makes it possible for people to resolve disputes about rights in a way that is consistent with the rightful honour of all. Legitimacy flows from what the state does, and so does not require an explicit act of instituting it.

**Contention. First is the theory of property**. The right to own objects is derivative of the right to a sphere of freedom – property gives individuals the means to achieve their aims. Recognizing that other people’s property excludes you is recognizing that they are an agent that deserves respect and a limitation of your freedom.

**Additionally**, means property rights aren’t fundamentally to objects, but rights to fulfill your purposes through action. A *particular* system of property clearly isn’t essential since entire societies have been structured around alternative views of ownership, taking it as such inflates a social bias. Precludes property or contract offense: The state can choose whether or not to consider something legitimate property, the question is whether that initial decision is rightful. Property rights arguments beg that question.

Two reasons to affirm:

1. The state can only allow the acquisition of property if its ownership is compatible with everyone’s ability to sustain their free activity. It thus implies a living wage requirement. **Wood 2**[[5]](#footnote-5)

All property, according to Fichte, depends on the property contract, through which people apportion their respective external spheres for free action. The purpose of entering into this contract is to acquire a sufficient external sphere to perpetuate one's free activity in the future, that is, to satisfy one's external needs (GA I/4:21). Fichte infers that only those are parties to the property contract who thereby acquire some property, and enough property that they can live by what they acquire (GA I/4:8-9, 20-22). The state's fundamental responsibility for protecting the private property of every citizen therefore charges the state with the duty of distributing property [so] in such a way that no individual falls into destitution. Conversely, every citizen must have an occupation, which is known to the state and which the state can guarantee as a sufficient means of livelihood (GA I/4:23).

2. Sustaining yourself from your action is a right. If you don’t have that, some citizens have access to a type of property that others do not – even if you can survive, that’s not sufficient which takes out subsidies CPs. **Scharding[[6]](#footnote-6)**

To summarize, we can see that the right to live from one’s work but not a program of basic income satisfies the three antecedent rights that Fichte has defended (bodily integrity, free activity, and property). Both the right to live from one’s work and basic income satisfy some aspects of the right to bodily integrity but only the right to live from one’s work guarantees free activity (I discuss in greater detail how the right to live from one’s work satisfies the original right to free activity in section 1.4, below). While basic income satisfies some parts of the right to property in the external objects needed to secure one’s survival—i.e., by providing income with which such objects can be purchased—it does not respect that people have property rights in their own activities and are entitled to be able to use those activities to generate the means of their self-support. (In section 1.3.1, above, I explained why we should endorse Fichte’s claim that people have such property rights.) On the basic income regime, basic income recipients depend on other people’s productive activities for their survival. Basic income also violates the protection contract—which requires people to ensure that everyone’s property, including property in activities is protected—and the unification contract, in the sense that some people will not have a certain kind of property and their co-citizens will have failed to ensure that this property is available universally.

**Second** is respect. The employment relation should be a relation of respect – The framework proves you need to be recognized by others to have agency. Recognition is only valuable if you value the other person as a judge, so in order to yourself have a claim to value, you need to respect the value of all other agents who recognize you. **Velleman[[7]](#footnote-7)**

Respect for others is required, in Kant’s view, because the capacity for valuation cannot take seriously the values that it attributes to things unless it first takes itself seriously; and it cannot first take itself seriously if it treats instances of itself as nothing more than means to things that it already values.91 That’s why the capacity for valuation, when facing instances of itself, must respond in the manner constitutive of respect, by restraining its self-interested tendency to treat them as means

That justifies the form of the living wage. **Zatz[[8]](#footnote-8)**

Second, wages and state transfers are not interchangeable even if they possess the same dollar value.133 Instead, the social meaning of the wage is such that workers may be deprived of equal respect if their work is valued too little, a disrespect that cannot be cured by a payment from a third party. If so, raising wages would be more effective than government transfers. Whether this point matters depends on specifying more precisely the injustice of low wages: is it simply that workers are deprived of an equal opportunity to gain access to money, or is it that they are deprived of participating on particular terms in a richer relationship of economic and social interconnection? The latter point replicates with regard to wages the terms of an established debate over access to employment: is there any reason for the state to guarantee access to jobs or only to guarantee access to income?134 The reasons for granting independent significance to wages might also provide a noninstrumental basis for placing some duties on employers. For instance, those reasons might involve insisting that employment is not purely an arms-length relationship but rather brings with it some obligations of mutual regard.135 Something like that appears to be the intuition behind the old rallying cry that “the labor of a human being is not a commodity.”136

*[To clarify, wages don’t independently signify respect, merely respect for labor, and the refusal to instrumentalize human being’s capacity for it. Agents are still valuable regardless of their engagement with the labor system – the living wage merely indicates you deserve to be compensated for having done so.]*

***[****Turns indicts of the wage system – my model places duties on employment that change the wage relation from purely transactional to one that recognizes the value of the investment that human beings put into work]*

1. Employment-based and consequentialist turns can’t link to the standard –

**A.** This is a question of the conditions of a legitimate state. Negative effects may otherwise be relevant *to* the state, but in this instance they can’t be – otherwise the state wouldn’t exist as an agent at all, which it must in order to satisfy any conditions of right

**B.** I justify a right to a living wage – rights claims can’t be contingent on consequences. **Mayeda**[[9]](#footnote-9)

In contrast, Fichte grounds rights, not in contingent contracts, but in the necessity of respecting human individuality. For him, it does not matter whether it is good for society generally to have the contents of books disseminated in the public domain. Any practice which denies a person’s individuality by forcing them to give up what is theirs, that is any practice which forces them to give up their property in a book, is a violation of right.72 Fichte thus articulates the foundational view of the natural rights theory that rights are innate and inalienable and derived from the nature of human existence.73 This right is not variable depending on contingent, historically emergent social circumstances. Rather, it is eternal74 because it is deduced from the unchangeable nature of human freedom. Thus, Fichte points out that, had they wished, even the ancients could have protected their works against reproduction.75

**C.** Independent of the framework, withdrawing rights protection because of its costs is absurd – it only makes sense if you forgo distributive justice and naturalize the result of market transactions. The implication of such offense is the need for additional policies, not less regulation. **Zatz 2[[10]](#footnote-10)**

Third, there remains the vexing problem of perversity: even if employers rightly bear some responsibility for paying higher wages, will their successful attempts to evade that responsibility render the policy counterproductive? I worry that objections of this sort permit a heckler’s veto. In the employment discrimination context, the theory is that mandating costly protections for women, people of color, and people with disabilities leads to hiring discrimination against them. That’s a reality to be faced, but it may counsel intensifying enforcement against hiring discrimination and implementing other means to counteract it. When one person’s free speech (access to nondiscriminatory working conditions) provokes heckling or violence (hiring discrimination), we often think that the proper response is not to withdraw the speaker’s protection (scale back antidiscrimination law) but instead to suppress or neutralize the heckling. Such efforts will be costly, but so what? That is just the general problem of pursuing distributive justice and rejecting a market baseline. The persuasiveness of the perversity argument seems ultimately to depend on normative sympathy for the heckler (who discriminates in one way in order to avoid the costs imposed by the ban on discriminating in another way), or on prioritizing those harmed by the heckler over those whose protection provokes the heckling.137 In the minimum wage context, the analogous argument would go like this: Yes, it is unfair if paying just wages to some causes others to lose their jobs. The latter group lacks employment for reasons beyond their own responsibility. Something must be done. But surely cutting the minimum wage is not the only tool available to fight involuntary unemployment. That tool leaps to mind only if we privilege a market baseline that lacks wage regulation. That baseline, however, is exactly what liberal egalitarians reject. Instead, the problem of involuntary unemployment created by labor and employment regulation—to whatever extent it occurs at all—is simply a special case of involuntary unemployment more generally. Taking the perversity argument seriously might well lead us toward more labor and employment policies that include job creation and other active labor market practices, rather than toward deregulation.

2. Actions are unified by the structure of the will from their end to their means. It creates a cohesive whole instead of fragmented steps and explains why the agent is engaged in the subsidiary actions. **Callard[[11]](#footnote-11)**

If this is right, it sheds light on something crucially un-Aristotelian about Neo- Aristotelianism. Intentional actions often have something like the following structure: the agent X-es in order to Y, and his reason for Y-ing is that it contributes to or makes possible another desirable action, Z. On such an occasion, when asked what he is doing, the agent can often truthfully answer “I am X-ing” or “I am Y-ing” or “I am Z-ing.” For instance, to take up an example of Michael Thompson’s, if he is cracking some eggs in order to make and omelet, and he is doing that to make breakfast, he can answer “I am cracking eggs” or “I am making an omelet” or “I am making breakfast.” [REF] It is hard to deny that something like this is usually going on when we act—though perhaps there are simple or basic actions for which another story must be told. So let’s call my story, ‘the story of nonbasic intentional action.’

This must be true or our common act descriptions would be incoherent. The idea of “giving up,” “succeeding” or “being interrupted” only makes sense if we take action to be unified, since otherwise they would merely mark a distinction between two discrete actions rather than a break in the steps of one.

That **A.** implies an intent/foresight distinction – foreseen harms aren’t an operation of the will since they’re conditions *in spite of which* you act. You would take the same action and consider it a success regardless. Independently key to **motivation:** If we’re complicit in all the harms we allow to continue even if we didn’t consider them in our action by considering other standards, we’d never be able to pursue personal projects – it’s over demanding.

**B.** it makes maximizing freedom incoherent – every action can be divided infinitely into smaller actions that are free, so there’s already an infinite amount of free action.

And **C.** Proves consequentialism impossible. It can’t provide the necessary ground for doing an action B since it isn’t *the same premise* throughout time but different ones that happen to be the same. It can’t justify unifying subsidiary action **Rödl[[12]](#footnote-12)**

An intention to do A2 cannot rest on a judgment that desires earlier were best served by doing B. It can rest only on a judgment that doing B is best given all desires now. If appetite unified by a calculation is the order of practical reason, then she who conforms to it forms two intentions to do B: one is the ground of her intention to take the first step and do A1, another the ground of her intention to take the second step and do A2. One might think that there are not two intentions, but one that remains, if the desires on which the intention is based remains. But this is wrong. The ground of an intention is a judgment that desires, all in all, speak in favor of doing A. As desires come and go, that judgment contains a reference to a time. It is a judgment that desires now present all in all speak in favor of doing A. Such a judgment made at t1 bears no logical connection with the judgment expressed by the same words at t2, no matter whether the same things are present at t1 and t2, no matter whether it was probably or even necessary that the same things would be present. On Davidson;s account, the same holds true of all-out judgments, or intentions, as their basis is an all-things considered judgment: judging all out at t1 to do B and judging all out at t2 to do B are different judgments, regardless of whether the desires changed in the meantime, whether it was unlikely or even impossible that they would change.

## Underview

**1)** There is a side bias against the aff- the neg won 8 percent[[13]](#footnote-13) more rounds at octas and quarters bids this year. Prefer statistics since they take into account all factors leading to the side bias, so any logical argument for why the aff should have an advantage is empirically denied. This means you reject theory not weighed against the side bias, since something I do that is slightly abusive is actually good because it just corrects for the side bias.

**2)** No 2NR theory or metatheory-a) It skews my time because the I only have 3 minutes to respond to 6 minutes so he has more time on the theory debate b) no judge will vote on a 2ar rvi so it’s a no risk issue that can eat up the little amount of time I have. If we each spend a minute on theory the skew will be 5-2 which is worse than 6-3. **And,** no 2NR RVIs – they could always collapse to theory in the 2N with long scripts I couldn’t have predicted since the justification wasn’t there when I made my choice, that’s strat skew.

3) Conceded aff arguments outweigh (conceded) neg arguments since temporally they came first. Also key to clash by forcing neg to answer aff arguments.

4) Theory on AC spikes is a reason to prefer your interp and reject a spike, not a reason to drop the debater. This is most logical since an interp that indicts an AC spike only justifies why that spike is a bad norm, not the fact that the spike being run is proactively bad. Additionally, that would be terrible since every debate would come down to theory framing issues- he could read “competing interps bad” theory- , meaning we’d never engage in actual theory debates.

5) On T reevaluate my offense under their interp – **A.** Competing mutually exclusive interps force the to be subject to some shell every round, which creates free, no-risk NC preclusion. I have to pick an interp, so don’t punish me for going into the round blind. **B.** I can’t read T on the neg so it’s irreciprocal if they can win on it, it’s a layer I can’t have offense on that can be made to outweigh any theory argument. Reevaluating offense solves since T is no longer something they can win on. **C.** T or theory as a reason to drop the debater uniquely advantages the neg since the fact that the NC is longer than the 1ar means I’m forced to cover the shell since I lose if I don’t, and he can always not go for it. If we each spend 1:30 on that debate he gets an advantage since 5:30-2:30 is worse than 7:40. This means neg theory is drop the argument.

6) Aff theory is a reason to drop the debater since the 1ar is only four minutes which is not enough time to win both substance and theory. I need drop the debater or he can be abusive and force me to waste more time than I can afford just

# Addons

## Role of the Ballot (:30/:45)

The role of the ballot is to determine via fair arguments whether the resolutional statement is true or false by a substantively justified ethical framework.

1. The neg may not contest the aff role of the ballot if it’s structurally reciprocal.

**A.** **Substance**: Role of the ballot contestation shifts the question away from substantive issues. We get the benefit of their preferred framework when they affirm, which turns their offense since it forces the debates they prefer to happen, otherwise people go for procedurals and never engage.

**B. Strat Skew**: the aff must take a stance by speaking first and devote six minutes to generating offense under it, but the neg can always moot that. This is worse than other preclusion because those starting points frame all offense or even what we need offense to. The LD 1AR is also too short to do enough work on multiple layers which gives the neg an easy win. In-round competitive equity is a necessary constraint and comes first: in-round equity is constitutive of games since it’s why the game is a test of skill. The activity’s competitive nature is what motivates engagement and research, it’s how we access other benefits.

**C. Engagement**: infinite number of possible methods and role of the ballots. It’s impossible for us to have a debate unless I know what the neg will say and can make my speech relevant, otherwise the goal is always just to blindside the aff.

2. Some conversations about ideal theory are good. Broad principles change peoples minds in inclusive ways and allow previously-excluded groups to claim political agency. **Holmstrom concurs with Mills[[14]](#footnote-14)**

We have to speak to people where they are, he says, and that means appealing to core values of liberalism: individualism, equal rights and moral egalitarianism. Against what he calls the conventional wisdom among radi- cals, he argues that there is no inherent incompatibility between these values and a radical agenda. If these values are suitably interpreted, I think he is absolutely right. Over two hundred years ago, Mary Wollstonecraft and Toussaint Louverture took the abstract universalistic principles of the French Revolution and extended them to groups they were intended to exclude. Gradually and incompletely women and blacks and landless men have achieved the democratic rights promised to all (in words) by the anti-feudal revolution. So I agree with Charles that such universalistic principles have great value; even if usually applied in self-serving ways, they have a deeply radical potential and it would be foolish of radicals to reject them, any more than we should reject all of the technological developments of the Indus- trial Revolution which also developed with the rise of capitalism. in fact, few American radicals have rejected these aspects of liberalism in their politi- cal practice but have been their strongest champions since the Revolution; socialists of all kinds helped to build the labor and civil rights movements.‘

3. We need fixed principles to have any meaningful application. Just as you cannot measure something with a ruler constantly changing length, you need a standard by which to judge real world events. Otherwise your framework is incoherent because it cannot measure moral progress at all.

### AT Ideal Theory Bad

**A.** Bracketing discussions of ideal theory is key and solves disads – we can obviously say an ideal government ought to do a thing but recognize that real-world injustices demand a different approach. Only separating discussions of ideal and nonideal theory can allow us to understand the distinction. This topic is clearly about ideal theory, whereas last year’s jan-feb topic about developing countries in the real world.

## Interpretations (:45)

The resolution is a question of what is intrinsic to being a just government. **Damerdji ‘14[[15]](#footnote-15)**

Some people will still spec to the US, but that can’t be right, aside from the plural “governments” issue. The resolution is about what ideal governments are logically required to do. Otherwise, having both “just” and “ought” would be redundant. I’d conjecture that anyone unfamiliar with LD would read the resolution the same way; it’s just that we’re accustomed to reading “ought” as a “moral obligation” that causes this difference. If I’m right that the resolution is about an ideal government, then a fortiori no country in the world would be topical to defend. If it’s just an idealized form of an existing government, that very much seems to stray away from the actual words in the resolution.

**Thus**, the aff doesn’t need to defend a specific actor implementing a policy action – the round is about whether an ideal government (determined by a framework) would do rather than any specific government.

Prefer this definition:

**A. Context**: My ev interprets the entire statement rather than a single word. Multiple definitions of terms exist and we decide among them contextually, so my interp captures the way we use language.

**B. Consilience**: Other interps moot a modifier in the resolution, which artificially complicates it and violates our intuitions that modifiers restrict a statement’s scope, so their interp is less predictable and understandable.

**C.** **Common Usage**: I capture how everyday speakers would use the phrase, speak to why it’s controversial in LD. Even if they win that their interp is a possible one, I can explain why that confusion arises, so err my way.

**D**. **Grammar**: my interp is naturally implied by a plural generic noun phrase used with “ought”. **Lawler ‘15[[16]](#footnote-16)**

Just governments in the debate topic is a plural generic noun phrase; when used as the subject of a deontic should (or ought to), it means "in order to be considered a Just Government any government should, as a matter of definition, ". Obviously, this is a chewy topic to define terms for. Justice, government, justice as government applies it, justice as it applies to the government, living, wage, living wage, providing a living wage, the list goes on. Notice that employees are nowhere mentioned in the topic; does this mean they are irrelevant? Cui bono? – John Lawler Jan 2 at 18:39

**E. Quals**: the Lawler evidence concurring with my interp is from a professor at UMich with authority and multiple articles on English generics – he’s most qualified to speak to resolutional semantics

# Framework Frontlines

## AT Consequentialism

1. **Extend Neuhouser**, understanding our own agency requires a sphere of freedom to which others have no access. That constraint is why we can be agents at all: we need to understand our individuality for any free action. Aggregation for a social good denies that absoluteness of persons.

2. **Extend Mayeda**: individual rights are based on freedom, which is unconditionally valuable per the framework; changing the bounds of freedom based on consequences is inconsistent with its justification and makes freedom itself inconsistently valuable; that’s impossible since it’s the basis of our moral claims.

3. Unity of action: only way to describe our common act descriptions – we couldn’t say we were “interrupted” unless our aim created a cohesive whole out of all of our movements, that’s **Callard**. Excludes util, three levels:

**A.** Foreseen consequences are not relevant because they’re not part of the end that you will, which is what constitutes a morally relevant action: that’s why a tree falling or an involuntary spasm isn’t blameworthy.

**B. Extend** **Rödl**: calculations from desire are based on a changeable state, which means that it’s actually a *separate* desire at two different times that’s just coincidentally the same. We aren’t reasoning towards the same end then, so acting from consequences isn’t really moral action at all.

**C.** Every free action can be infinitely subdivided, which means there’s an infinite amount of every good consequences.

4. **Extend Zatz 2** – negative consequences are reasons to engage in other policies in addition to the aff unless it’s literally unavoidable: like having to set a wage rate linking to Levinas. This is a meta-level claim what we have moral reason to do, so frames how we interpret your offense.

5. **Extend the A point of impact calc**, this is a question of the conditions of a legitimate state. Without this, the state wouldn’t exist as an agent at all, which it must in order to satisfy any conditions of right or consider negative effects generally.

### AT Util FW Specifically

Extend the **A** point under **Wood**, freedom is the internal link to any ethic – the structure of our agency requires freedom to move from any drive or inclination, so I control the link to their instantiation.

And the **[B/C]** point, we cannot act without freedom, but our attraction to certain pleasures is contingent and empirical – I could imagine a world in which I didn’t care about how pleasurable something was, but not one in which I couldn’t reflect on my desires freely.

## AT Property Rights/Kantian NCs/Turns

1. **Extend that** property rights NCs ask the wrong question: rights claims are only established after the state exists to reconcile them but they can’t exist in a state of nature, that’s **Neuhouser 2**. This is terminal defense to the NC since what the state should consider legitimate property needs to be settled before enforcing that schema and only the AC speaks to that

2. I recontextualize your standard so my impact outweighs: “property” rights are the right to achieve aims THROUGH actions, which may *require* objects rather than rights to the objects themselves. A living wage requirement prohibits employers from denying that innate right, that’s **Scharding**. Prefer:

**A.** control the internal link: the first argument in the contention shows recognition of individuals as having a right to pursue their ends is why we establish property claims at all, since it establishes a limitation for others

**B.** empirical confirmation: **extend that** entire systems have been structured around alternative models of ownership: specific arrangements of material goods are not innate. They inflate a social bias rather than identifying something morally important.

3. **Extend Wood 2**, a precondition for protecting property is universal agreement to that system of property – only the concurrence of wills prevents property from just being an exertion of individual force. Universal agreement is only possible if individuals can assent which requires they can sustain themselves

## AT Levinas NC

1. You must already have a conception of an agent before encountering the Other, otherwise you couldn’t explain why an *agent* makes a demand on you but a rock does not. This means that you know of the Other’s agency and can understand their cognition, since that’s logically prior – that’s the argument above the standard, I hijack and disprove the critical premise of Levinasian NCs so it’s a reason to prefer the aff framework

2. The framework establishes the conditions necessary for being a rational being at all—whether or not the others I encounter are in fact such is an empirical question rather than a moral one. I don’t need to access others’ minds to know what principles rational beings are bound by, because the framework establishes those principles purely *a priori*.

3. The Levinesian project is impossible: independently of what you can impose on an Other, you need to have a concept *of* the other, The only source for that judgment is your first person model of cognition since you aren’t aware of other ones

4. Your agency is derivative of a summons per Neuhouser, which means your consciousness is partially the result of the Other calling you to account, which is a premise Levinas would agree to. That means that the way you understand reason comes from the way the Other did in summoning you so they must be similar.

*[read generics too]*

# Counterplan Frontlines

## AT Government Subsidies CP (EITC, Wage Subsidies, UBI)

1. Respect is a solvency deficit – **Zatz** proves government payments don’t demonstrate respect, it’s perceived differently. Workers are entitled to respect as rational agents, since agency must take itself to be intrinsically valuable in order to assign value to their contingent ends. Managers are socially positioned to show it since they benefit from labor. **Scharding[[17]](#footnote-17)**

This is because, as Fichte cautions, workers’ respect for managers’ depends on the managers showing respect for the workers. In particular, managers should respect the workers’ basic freedoms and accept that their superior workplace position entitles managers only to counsel, not to command, their workers (SE [IV, 363], p. 343). Fichte offers a few rules of thumb for managers’ interactions with workers: (1) they must make it obvious that they respect the workers, (2) they must show that they acknowledge the dignity of both the workers and of their (working class) estate generally, and (3) managers must speak to workers in a manner that the workers can easily understand, rather than obscuring their instructions with sophisticated word choices and fancy phrasing that could confuse people who have less education (SE [IV, 363], p. 343). In this sense, workers would gain an idea of the esteem to which they are entitled as rational beings. The managers are further inspired to show this esteem in virtue of the expertise that the laborers demonstrate at performing their responsibilities (whether or not the workers designed the specific procedures by which they accomplish their tasks).

2. **Scharding** from the AC is a disad to the CP – extend that you have a right to sustain yourself from your activities – the top of the contention establishes that as the most fundamental right since it’s the basis of claims to objects. Subsidies depend on *other* people’s productive activities and the elimination of a living wage requirement for employment denies that individuals have that right at all, both are inconsistent with the AC.

### Perm AT Wage Subsidies

Perm, do the counterplan: **Merriam-Webster**[[18]](#footnote-18) defines “pay” as is to [with obj.] give (someone) money that is due for work done, goods received, or a debt incurred

The CP gives some of the money to corporations, but still requires them to pay a living wage. That’s why a corporation couldn’t just take the money and reinvest it in the business.

You clarify an implementation mechanism for the aff, which is legitimate perm ground – otherwise every neg could just specify something that wasn’t explicitly in the plan text as a counteradvocacy. It’s not a real opportunity cost to the aff, since it’s a way of doing it, so competition is illogical and it means the neg could just coopt aff offense with more spec no matter what which makes it impossible to be aff.

## AT Job Guarantee CP

Perm: do both – The combination allows the state to know that every person has the means to support themselves. CP alone means people can be, either by choice or private coercion, made to work for wages that don’t allow them to sustain themselves, which all the AC indicates isn’t offense

*[Reading Fichte or secondary sources doesn’t prove the CP is better – he would actually like both policies since he thinks the government needs to ASSURE every individual can work to survive, whether or not they take up a particular government program]*

## AT Union Bargaining CP

Perm: do both, the counterplan alone makes it possible for wages to be lower than a living wage, which means the government can’t fulfill the essential guarantee of property and *ensure* sustenance wages, that’s **Wood**. Minor solvency deficit to the CP is irrelevant if it’s entirely inconsistent with the AC framework; size of the link outweighs

Also, if wages increase *more* with the CP, there’s not really a disad – the minimum wage wouldn’t be binding since wages are higher. *[Their “competition” cards are about government reliance on one as the dominant means of wage setting, collective agreements can be dominant, with a governmental recognition that only fair wages are legitimate outcomes of bargaining.]*

# Other Cards

Intentional action is the conclusion of an inference that your actions are justified by your reasons. However, that entails taking yourself as one who acts for reasons: that’s a commitment you’ve already made. **Pippin on Rödl**

Herein lies another lesson, though, in the difficulty of finding the right formulation. Rödl, in discussing the main features of this order, inferential relations, believing q because I believe p and p implies q, argues that such inferences themselves reveal[s] that there must be a reason it is right to believe something other than because of an inference from something else one believes. This different way “will reveal the order under which I bring myself in asking what to believe.” (70) He recalls the previous chapter on action, where he had shown that a chain of practical instrumental reasoning terminates “in a finite end that no longer falls under the normative order under which the conclusion is brought, but is that order.”(Ibid.) Likewise, he says now, in theoretical knowledge, “a chain of inferences must terminate in beliefs that no longer conform to, but are the order to which beliefs inferred from them conform.” (71) Later he will say that “the order of inference is not self- standing.” (88) Rather, “inference is governed by an order to which one conforms in acts of believing that something is the case that manifests a power of knowledge.” (Ibid.) (This is a difficult sentence. The last that clause could modify “order” of “acts of believing.” The ambiguity does not effect the point I want to make, which is this.) But it cannot be the case that this moment that defines the rightness of the whole order of inferences, is itself the content of a separate belief or representation.

**A. Solves Infinite Regress:** unless practical reason is constitutive of action, you ask why particular premises A and B would commit you to conclusion X. To solve, you need to add a premise C, that A and B are sufficient proof but you could then question why A, B *and C* are sufficient, which would always require another premise. No logical syllogism can be complete without conceding the metaethic so my impacts come first

**B.** The metaethic binds moral judgments directly to the form of normative reasoning. If another account is correct, the truth of moral statements would be indexed to some set of propositions – you could choose which logical. no proposition is impossible when affixed to the right locus of duty, and denial would cease to be competitive with me demonstrating a statement’s truth.

That justifies the form of the living wage. **Rogers[[19]](#footnote-19)**

The fact that employment is a bilateral and reciprocal relationship justifies the institutional form of minimum wage laws, i.e., the requirement that employers themselves pay higher wages. The harsh conditions and status harms of low-wage employment do not occur in a vacuum: employers and managers enjoy individualized and institutional benefits from workers’ efforts, benefits that are not always shared with the rest of society. Those include profits as well as the higher social esteem and occupational autonomy that accompany entrepreneurship and management. Given such agent-specific benefits, and given that such benefits occur within social structures that impose reciprocal harms on employees, it seems entirely appropriate for employers to shoulder the bulk of the redistributive burdens imposed by minimum wage laws, rather than mediating all redistribution through the state. Transfers simply have a different valence: they alter power relationships between workers and employers indirectly, if at all. While a robust basic income would enable workers to reject truly undignified work, it would not alter the legal rules that undergird the division of labor.159 Employers would still enjoy the legal right to issue orders, and low-wage workers would still need to obey. Altering parties’ bilateral entitlements is therefore an appropriate policy response. Minimum wages are also far more salient to workers than transfers.160 As noted above, wages are paid weekly or biweekly by the employer, reflecting the employer’s reciprocal duties toward workers; in contrast, transfers come from the state, an abstract entity that typically exerts power over workers only indirectly. Wage subsidies would avoid some of these difficulties since workers receive money directly from their employer, but wage subsidies have other drawbacks, as discussed below.161 To be clear, this is not an argument that minimum wage laws require employers to personally express respect for workers. Since respect is an aspect of social relationships it simply cannot be mandated by the state.162 But the state often does forbid practices and behaviors that tend to undermine individuals’ self-respect; or, in Rawls’s evocative phrasing, practices that encourage “attitudes of deference and servility on one side [and] a will to dominate and arrogance on the other.”163 Rules against sexual and racial harassment are a powerful and clear example.164 Minimum wage laws are another. They prohibit a certain class of employment relationships that lead to pervasive status harms. Moreover, even if employers pay minimum wages grudgingly, doing so may well reinforce workers’ self-respect by demonstrating that the law protects them against certain employer actions.

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17. Scharding, Tobey K. "Individual Differences and Political Equality Two Reconciliations." [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
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19. Rogers, Brishen [Assistant Professor of Law, Temple University James E. Beasley School of Law]. "Justice at Work: Minimum Wage Laws and Social Equality." Texas Law Review 92 (2013): 1543. Brackets in original [↑](#footnote-ref-19)